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Japan’s economic history since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 is characterised by 
alternating phases of less conspicuous growth performance in pre-war times, 
phenomenal growth of the 1955-73 period, and marked deceleration thereafter. The first 
two phases are the period of industrialisation and the third was that of rapid 
de-industrialisation and a rise of the service economy. This paper reviews issues and 
evidence concerning her growth performance in the century-long period of 
industrialisation, and places the recent decades of slowdown and the prospect for the 
future in the long-term historical context. The issues to be examined may be grouped 
under the following five headings: the Gerschenkronian effects (which include not only 
the transplanting of the factory and other western systems in early stages but also 
technology transfer through FDI and licensing in later periods), changing international 
environments (in both commodity and capital markets, which in turn were influenced 
by changing global power balances), the role of industrial and economic policies, 
investment in infrastructure and human capital, and the distinct mode of skill 
formation. The paper identifies a set of factors that contributed to enhancing 
productivity of the manufacturing sector in the industrialisation period (placing greater 
emphasis on saving ratios, human capital investment and a distinct mode of skill 
formation within the firm, than on government policies), and then asks if a new regime 
of productivity growth has emerged in the rapidly expanding service economy. 
 1 
1. Gerschenkronian situations 
 
When Japan opened the country in 1859, she found herself in typical Gerschenkronian 
situations. Compared with the West, Japan was materially and institutionally 
‘backward’. Meiji statesmen, government officials and intellectuals, who saw Britain 
and other Western countries at first hand, realised that their country was lagging 
behind the West where unprecedented progress was made since the industrial 
revolution. In the words of a contemporary who was on a mission to the USA and 
European countries in the early 1870s,   
‘It is since 1800 that Europe has attained its present wealth; and it is only in the 
last forty years that it has achieved the truly remarkable level of prosperity we now 
see’.1
This remark is interesting because the author, having gauged the degree of his country’s 
backwardness, thought that they would probably be able to catch up. Judging from this 
and other writings, what Meiji leaders saw was ‘iron and coal’ being the material base of 
the wealth of the West. It implies that the lack of the factory system and its energy base 
in the manufacturing sector was the real cause of Japanese backwardness, and the view 
was shared by many contemporaries, ranging from statesmen like Tochimichi Okubo, 
who was a vice ambassador of the Iwakura mission, to liberal-minded intellectuals such 
as Yukichi Fukuzawa, the prominent Meiji enlightenment leader. As Alexander 
Gerschenkron argues, such components of the West’s material culture are transferable. 
This often led to emphasise on state-led import substitution and on heavy rather than 
light industry as the policy’s target industry, and such efforts may well have resulted in 
a sudden but unstable ‘big spurt’.2 Thus, the conventional wisdom has been that the 
more backward, the larger the role of the state and the higher the rate of initial growth. 
Japan has often been regarded as a typical case in which the state played a substantial 
role in promoting successful industrialisation.   
 
                                                  
1 Kume, K., compiler, The Iwakura Embassy, 1871-73. A True Account of the 
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary’s Journey of Observation through the 
United States of America and Europe. vol.II: Britain, trans. G. Healey (Richmond, 
Surrey: Curzon Press, 2002), p.57. Emphasis added. 
2 A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Berknap Press, 1962). The idea of ‘big spurt’ is also shred by W.W. Rostow, The 
Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), although 
Gerschenkron was critical of Rostow’s stage theoretic approach. See “A postscript” to 
Economic Backwardness.  
 2Let us first look at Japan’s actual performance in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, by placing it in global perspective. If we chart Angus Maddison’s per-capita 
GDP estimates for Japan, together with those for China, western Europe and the world 
in one diagram (figure 1), it is evident that Japan’s growth performance was never 
spectacular in the period before the 1950s. Until 1950, Japan’s loci did not deviate from 
those of the world, which were well below the west European curve. It was in the very 
short period of the third quarter of the twentieth century, the era of ‘high economic 
growth’, when Japan changed the affiliation from the world’s average to the advanced 
countries’ group. This implies, on the one hand, that Japan did not fail to keep up with 
the others, which should be contrasted with trouble-ridden China of the late imperial 
and republican period. It should also be noted, on the other hand, that Japan was never 
a high performer during the pre-war period—nothing but one of average countries of the 
world. Kazushi Ohkawa once characterised the pattern of Japanese economic growth as 
‘trend acceleration’.3 Their intention was that Japan’s growth did not begin by a big 
spurt as Gerschenkron predicted. What he and his associates found instead is that the 
estimated rate of economic growth increased since the end of the nineteenth century. It 
is true that the slope of the trend line was gentler in the period before the First World 
War, when the growth process was steady and balanced, than in the inter-war period, 
during which the process became uneven and unbalanced.4 Also true is, as Arthur 
Lewis pointed out as early as 1949,5 that the impact of the Great Depression on the 
Japanese economy in the 1930s was less severe with a swifter recovery than in the 
advanced countries of the West. But, we all know what followed in the late 1930s and 
the early 40s. And, if comparison is made, a s  i n  f i g u r e  1 ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
distance from the top group of the world, it is probably more appropriate to say that 
Japan’s catch-up did not take place until 1950. In Japan, a ‘big spurt’ came as late as the 
1950s and 60s. 
 
Turning to the ‘role of the state’ question, there are several reasons to believe that the 
direct role of the government was not great until the late 1930s. First, despite the early 
Meiji government’s well-known emphasis on state-financed Westernisation projects, a 
close look at what the Meiji state actually did reveals that the proportion of government 
                                                  
3 K. Ohkawa and H. Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the 
Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), and K. Ohkawa and M. 
Shinohara, eds., Patterns of Japanese Economic development: A Quantitative Appraisal 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), ch.1. 
4 T. Nakamura, Economic Growth in Prewar Japan (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 1983). 
5 W.A. Lewis, Economic Survey 1919-1939 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1949). 
 3money spent on industrial promotion in the form of model factories was relatively small, 
and that much of the funds mobilised in the early Meiji years went to infrastructure 
building, i.e. railways. And, second, even this policy of industrial promotion was 
abandoned as early as the late 1870s in favour of export promotion. As is well known, 
the export commodities—raw silk and tea—came from the traditional, cottage-industry 
sector. Third, all the government-run model factories were sold off later to private firms, 
and the first industrial take-off in the 1890s was due completely to private initiatives. 
Fourth, although the late Meiji government launched a state-owned iron and steel 
company, the share of government investment in fixed capital formation and the 
proportion of government expenditure to GDP were never high as far as the period 
before 1930 is concerned (see tables 1 and 2).   
 
Indeed, a recent synthesis is that the modern Japanese economy in the period up to the 
1930s was in a more or less non-interventionist regime.6 Thus, direct intervention by 
the government was very much limited in the process of Japan’s industrialisation, with 
the notable exception of 1938-45, in which the state geared economic management to a 
command economy model. All this of course does not necessarily mean that the state did 
not want to get involved in the business of promoting industry. Rather, despite the Meiji 
statesmen’s firm belief in the slogan, ‘rich nation, strong army’, i.e. that the nation’s 
development should be guided by the government, the menu of means of intervention 
was limited for the government. The trade treaties with the Western superpowers 
signed at the time of the opening of the nation did not allow the government to raise 
customs, and the terms of trade under that trade regime were generally unfavourable. 
On the other hand, government staff did not have expertise to run factories and 
companies; nor did they have enough revenue to subsidise all the strategic industries. 
Some verbal intervention was made in the areas of maritime shipping and shipbuilding, 
which, one may argue, foresaw industrial policy of the post-war period. The role of the 
government was most prominent in the areas of science and technology transfer from 
overseas. Although they were gradually replaced by newly educated Japanese, many 
science professors and engineers were invited from abroad and employed by the 
government at extremely high salary in the early Meiji period. In 1889, however, Japan 
started to permit inward FDI in return to the revision of commerce treaty and joined the 
                                                  
6 T. Okazaki and M. Okuno-Fujiwara, “Japan's present-day economic system and its 
historical origins”, Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara, eds., The Japanese Economic System 
and its Historical Origins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch.1; and Juro 
Teranishi,  Evolution of the Economic System in Japan (Cheltenham, Glos.: Edward 
Elgar, 2005). 
 4Paris Convention Treaty for the Protection of Industrial Property in the same year. 
Since then, inward FDI and licensing agreements, in addition to reverse engineering 
and imports of advanced capital goods, became more important as a channel of 
technology transfer.7 Otherwise, it was only the military sector that the state always 
cared for. The state-owned Yawata Steel came into existence because of its strategic 
importance for defence, but it was not until the 1930s when war against China was 
launched that a new military-fiscal state replaced the non-interventionist regime of 
economic management: as table 2 shows, the proportion of the government’s capital 
formation increased from 5 % in 1920 to 12 % in 1938 and that of government 
expenditure to GDE from 16 % to 36 %. 
 
In infrastructure and education, the government played a larger role. As noted above, 
early Meiji effort to introduce railways was financed by the government but the further 
development in the construction of rail networks was made under a dual system of state 
and private initiatives. While the share of capital formation by railways was higher in 
earlier periods, total operational mileage increased four-fold between 1900 and 1940 
(although the balance between the public and private sectors alternated from period to 
period).8 In postal service too, the whole system was transplanted from the West, and 
remained in the public sector until very recently. However, the Meiji government 
allowed local notables to run village post offices on their own premises as if the office 
business were a family asset. This mobilisation of de facto private resources enabled the 
postal network to spread far and wide in fairly early stages of its development. In other 
areas of transport and communication, the role of the central government is found in 
allocating subsidies to local government bodies. In road building, for example, much of 
the actual financial cost was shouldered by local governments. Subsidies became a 
means of leading local people to accept a national plan, and ‘pork barrel’ politics adopted 
by political parties intensified this tendency.   
 
Education is said to have been one of the areas in which the pre-war government was 
committed to invest. Compulsory education was introduced as early as 1886; the years 
required was extended from four to six in 1907, but the overall rate of enrolment 
reached 98 per cent by 1910. Over the period up to 1920, the proportion of students in 
                                                  
7 A. Goto and H. Odagiri, eds., Technology and Industrial Development in Japan: 
Building Capabilities by Learning, Innovation, and Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 
8 R. Minami, The Economic Development of Japan: A Quantitative Study (London: 
Macmillan, 1986), pp.115-122. 
 5primary, secondary and higher education to the total population rose to 19 per cent, 
which meant that although still behind the USA, Japan overtook the record of England 
and Wales.9 Two additional points may be made, however. One is that despite this 
progress in pre-war education, human capital embodied in the workforce increased at a 
moderate pace since it took several decades for a new better-educated generation to 
replace the elder, poorly-educated generation. Y. Godo and Y. Hayami have recently 
estimated average schooling for the period since 1880, which measures a number of 
schooling years averaged over all the age groups of the working population in a given 
year.10 According to their estimates (see figure 7 below), average schooling was only 1.9 
years for men and 0.6 years for women in 1890. Both male and female years multiplied 
by 1940, but the averages did not reach eight years. The other point is that not the 
whole system of education in both pre-war and post-war periods is state-financed. There 
are private schools at all levels but in secondary and higher education especially, much 
of the progress has been made by private initiatives. Just as in the area of 
infrastructure building, therefore, educational attainment was made in a relatively 
inexpensive manner.   
 
2. The era of high economic growth: 1955-73 
 
Japan’s full-fledge drive to industrialisation started in the inter-war period. One 
favourable factor had been laid out with Japan’s adoption of the gold standard in 1897. 
Since the gold had long been stronger than the silver, it changed the trade environment: 
while it was a blow to export-oriented traditional industries, the import of machinery 
and other goods necessary to build the modern, heavy and chemical industry became 
less costly. Then, unexpectedly, the outbreak of the First World War created a trade 
vacuum in the South and South-east Asian markets. The opportunities were seized by 
Japanese merchants, shipping agents and producers. The overseas demand was so 
strong that windfall profits were ploughed back: new firms were set up and further 
investment made in plant and equipment with license contracts from abroad. Many of 
such firms went bankrupt when the boom collapsed in 1920; yet a substantial number of 
new manufacturing enterprises that survived this and subsequent recessions laid the 
foundation for post-war industrial build-up.   
 
                                                  
9 Ibid. p.19. 
10 Y. Godo and Y. Hayami, “Catching up in education in the economic catch-up of Japan 
with the United States, 18901990”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol.50 
(2002), pp.961-978. 
 62.1 The international environment and the domestic economy
 
However, Japan’s take-off into full-fledged industrialisation occurred in an 
international environment characterised by great instability. The collapse of the pax 
Britannica was followed by the creation of trade blocs and growing exchange rates 
volatility, leading many countries including Japan to adopt a regime of command 
economy-type of economic management. Having learnt a lesson from the this experience, 
post-war leaders of the West set up an international economic regime aimed at 
enhancing free international trade and stable exchange rates. Many IMF member 
countries chose an adjustable-peg currency system until 1973. Except in the case of 
Article XIV countries, Article VIII of the IMF agreement prohibits member countries to 
restrict the convertibility of their currency for current international transactions. 
Several successful multilateral trade negotiations and the most favoured nation 
principle of GATT promoted international trade, especially in manufactured products. 
These international developments contributed to the economic growth of newly 
industrialising countries such as Japan, poorly endowed with natural resources and 
hence depending on processing trade. 
 
One defect of the post-war international economic regime was the lack of a sufficient 
system for the promotion of international capital flows. For example, the IMF 
agreement does not prohibit restrictions on capital transactions. The OECD played an 
important role in the liberalisation of capital controls, but only for member countries. 
Because of the end of gunboat diplomacy and the difficulty of providing collateral for 
sovereign debt, borrower countries are tempted to default on their debt. The risk of 
repudiations, the disappearance of plantations, and capital controls by developed and 
developing countries substantially reduced international capital flows from the rich 
countries to the developing world after the Second World War. Figures 2 and 3 compare 
the net capital outflow-GDP ratios of the developed country group in the pre-war and 
post-war period.11 It is evident that in comparison with the pre-war period, and 
especially the period before the First World War, the post-war period saw limited 
international capital flows from the developed country group.   
 
Yet, this defect in the post-war international regime did not act as a constraint on 
Japan’s development, since she never attempted a growth-cum-debt policy and strictly 
                                                  
11 Developed countries here are those who’s per capita GDP in 1990 Geary-Khamis 
dollars is greater than 50% of the US level. 
 7regulated direct and indirect international capital flows until the end of the 1970s. Even 
in the pre-war period, Japan financed capital formation from her own savings: her 
saving rates in the pre-war period appear to have been modest except in the period of 
1885-1900 and during the First World War boom period (figure 5). Much of the overseas 
investment by Britain and other advanced countries went to the Americas and the 
British colonies, such as India and South Africa, not to Japan. And, as figure 4 shows, 
Japan’s current account was generally balanced except in several short deficit periods, 
such as the period after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 (the current account deficit 
was financed by reparations), during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and the period 
after the Kanto Earthquake of 1923. Figure 4 also shows that after the Second World 
War, Japan’s gross saving rate increased considerably. The high saving ratio after the 
Second World War, the highest of all developed countries except Luxemburg (Figure 6), 
must have contributed to Japan’s high economic growth in this period. According to a 
growth accounting analysis by Jorgenson and Nomura, out of Japan’s aggregate labour 
productivity growth of 7.58% for the period of 1960-1973, 4.00% was accounted for by 
capital deepening.12  
 
The very high saving ratios in the 1950s and 60s resulted in high capital accumulation, 
which increased national income, but at the same time made the prices of consumption 
goods, especially durable consumer goods such as washing machines, refrigerators, TV 
sets, and cars, increasingly cheaper. With increasing urbanisation, this virtuous circle 
enlarged the domestic market, which in turn called for further investment in 
manufacturing. 13  Thus, the era of high economic growth was accompanied by 
accelerating industrialisation and saw the country joining the club of developed 
countries, until the domestic market reached a saturation point and the economy was 
hit by the oil crisis of 1973-4. However, this did not mark the end of growth through 
industrialisation. Japan’s response to the energy crisis in the subsequent decade was 
impressive and she was able to outperform most of the developed countries up until the 
beginning of the 1990s. As table 3 below shows, the rate of THP growth in the 
manufacturing sector remained well above the level of 1 per cent per annum until 1990. 
 
Much attention has been paid to industrial policy of the government, especially those 
                                                  
12 D. W. Jorgenson and K. Nomura, “The Industry Origins of Japanese Economic 
Growth,”  Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, vol. 19 (2005) 
pp.482–542. 
13  H. Yoshikawa, Macroeconomics and the Japanese Economy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
 8formulated by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in relation to 
the phenomenal growth of this period. According to the proponents of this view, it was 
the government ministries who prescribed which industries should be promoted, 
protected, or phased out, and the prescriptions were dispensed through guidance with a 
small amount of subsidies.14 There is some suggestion that the MITI played a certain 
role in the early stage of the computer industry, and that a disproportionately large 
amount of subsidies given to coal mining, textiles and other declining industries made 
their phase-out socially less costly.15 Given the empirical evidence, however, the role of 
the state in this period seems to have been exaggerated. The principal player of the era 
of high growth was the manufacturing industries who made large amounts of 
investment in plant and equipment on their own initiative. 
 
2.2 The Japanese system of employment and skill formation
 
This era also saw the rise of manufacturing firms on the international scene. Toyota, 
Toshiba, Sonny—to name but a few—became internationally known since then. All 
these, as well as other giant but less colourful firms in steel and shipbuilding, made 
heavy investment in introducing the most advanced packages of technology of the day. 
This represented a move towards mass production and, at the shop floor level, the 
installation of conveyor systems which, eventually, led the way to automation. Indeed, 
the 1950s and 60s was a period of Americanisation. A number of business missions were 
sent to the USA. It is interesting to note that missions organised by such bodies as the 
Japan Productivity Center included even union representatives as members. And the 
packages imported were not just about technologies but also workplace and other plant 
management techniques.   
 
However, this drive for mass production did not necessarily result in de-skilling of the 
workforce. In US manufacturing, historically, all sorts of management practices aimed 
at mass production, culminated in the Ford system, have tended to take skills away 
from the shop floor. Whenever a new scheme was introduced, as William Lazonick notes, 
steps were taken ‘to ensure that new skills would be in the possession of those who were 
part of the managerial team rather than those who labored for wages on the shop 
                                                  
14 See for example Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Grwoth of 
Industrial Policy 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983). 
15 R. Beason and D.E. Weinstein, “Growth, economies of scale, and targeting in Japan 
(1955-1990)”, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol.78, no.2 (1996), pp. 286-295. 
 9floor’.16 As a result, engineers and other types of salaried employees grew over the 
decades of the twentieth century, while the conveyor system degraded shop-floor 
workers into ‘interchangeable parts’. Japanese manufacturing firms of the 1950s and 
60s were fully aware that mass production would bring in economies of scale, but at the 
same time, they did not see workers as ‘interchangeable parts’; they did not want the 
workers to become totally de-skilled.   
 
First of all, a steady increase in human capital formation through the pre-war 
expansion of primary schooling bore fruit in this post-war period, especially in the era of 
high economic growth, 1955-70. Compulsory schooling became nine years by a post-war 
reform. As figure 7 shows, men’s average schooling, i.e. average schooling years of the 
whole male workforce, reached that level before 1960 and women’s during the 1960s. 
Post-war firms must have benefited a great deal from public investment made by 
education authorities in the pre-war period. 
 
M o r e  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  t h e  f a c t  that Japanese managers did not follow the 
American prescription in the area of skill management. As Lazonick puts it, ‘Like the 
British, Japanese managers have left considerable skill on the shop floor’.17 Japanese 
firms invested in raising workers’ firm-specific skills. A case in point is a system 
developed by Toyota, the car manufacturing giant. The Toyota production system, 
originated probably from post-war ‘Quality Control’ movements, gives more importance 
to factory workers than its pre-war predecessor, the Ford system. It attaches prime 
importance to work teams, not just as a coordination unit, but also as a monitoring unit 
for any stoppage in the production line, mechanical breakdowns and any other unusual 
events at the workplace, and also as a source of workplace improvements and 
innovations. Workers are encouraged to judge and act as a team beyond what is stated 
in work manuals. To put differently, they are encouraged to accumulate firm-specific 
skills over an extended period, and this attitude towards shop-floor skills is not confined 
to the auto industry. Indeed, it is commonplace for most manufacturing companies to 
train workers on the job and to allow them to broaden and enrich their knowledge and 
skills, mostly firm-specific, by working for the same firm over their work career. 
Japanese management has thus integrated shop-floor workers into the long-term 
                                                  
16 W. Lazonick, Competitive Advantage on the Shop Floor (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), p.229. 
17 Lazonick, op.cit. p.23. In British manufacturing, both skill training and the 
organisation of labour were practically in the hands of trade unions. 
 10evolution of the manufacturing industry.18  
 
Such workplace practices are closely related to the internal wage structure. A 
seniority-based wage scheme, adopted by a majority of Japanese firms, reflects the way 
in which skills are formed in Japanese manufacturing. Under the seniority wage system, 
the length of service is a crucial, but not the only, factor determining the wage level. For 
promotion, however, personal achievement is also important and, since it is likely to be 
associated with acquired skills over the past years, the system encourages workers to 
exert themselves to accumulate more and to stay on in the same firm, leading to 
longer-term employment. It is debatable if the firms of the period in question really 
made a decision to guarantee life-long employment, but it seems likely that both 
management and unions preferred stable employment to fluctuating wages.19 However, 
Asia’s New Giant, a Brookings Institution publication of the mid-1970s, went further to 
proclaim that it was   
‘a completely rational policy in terms of costs and profits for large Japanese 
employers, and that although workers welcomed the job security that it brought, ... 
the main reason for its survival has been economic efficiency’.20
The ‘efficiency’ is also guaranteed by the use of temporary employees and 
subcontracting. And it is these subcontractors who constitute the lower tiers of the 
so-called dual structure, which has long characterised Japan’s industrialisation process 
since the 1920s. According to Asia’s New Giant, ‘one of their functions is to bear the 
initial shock of fluctuation in demand, reducing the burden of the employment 
commitment borne by the major producers’.21 This diagnosis is not incorrect, as many 
such subcontractors are small in size, much less capital intensive, and hence low in 
wage rates, with no commitment in life-long employment. What the authors did not see 
at that time, however, is that it was part of the hierarchically structured relationships 
between manufactures/assemblers and suppliers, under which technological knowledge 
tends to flow from the large to the small and medium. Also important is that they too 
are skill intensive in a different manner from what large manufacturing firms have 
been practising. Most of such small and medium-sized enterprises take school leavers as 
                                                  
18 For the concept of ‘skill’ described here, see K. Koike, The Economics of Work in Japan 
(Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1995), especially ch.1. 
19 K. Odaka, “‘Japanese-style’ labour relations”, Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara, op.cit. 
ch.5. 
20 W. Galenson and K. Odaka, “The Japanese labor market”, in H. Patrick and H. 
Rosovsky, eds., Asia’s New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works (Washington, 
D.C.,The Brookings Institution, 1976), p.619. Emphasis added. 
21 Ibid. p.621. 
 11de facto factory apprentices. They too acquire skills on the job, which are more 
specialised and complementary skills—some firm-specific, some not; and levels of such 
workers have turned out to be extremely high. This, together with active networking 
within the industrial cluster (or Marshall’s ‘industrial district’), has made the small and 
medium sector a vital component of Japan’s whole industrial system.   
 
All this seems to suggest, therefore, that the whole system, formed in the era of 
industrialisation by integrating the labour-intensive and skill-intensive segments into 
the capital-intensive and skill-using mode of production, was not just efficient but also 
conductive to productivity growth in Japanese manufacturing. 
 
 
3. The era of deceleration: 1973-2006 
 
From the mid-1970s on, Japan’s economic growth decelerated. The average annual rate 
of growth in real GDP was 9.3% for 1955-73, 3.8% for 1973-91, and 1.1% for 1991-2005. 
Various factors caused the deceleration. First, by the early 1970s, the level of total 
factor productivity (TFP) in the machinery, chemical and metal industries had almost 
reached the US level and the technological catch-up process in the manufacturing sector 
slowed down.22 Second, after the 1960s, by which the baby boomer generation had 
entered the workforce, the growth of the population in the working age of 15-64 declined 
quickly (figure 8). In fact, while the working age population grew by an average of 1.7% 
annually between 1955 and 1973 and was still 0.7% between 1973 and 1995, since then 
it has actually been shrinking at an average annual rate of 0.3%. As we have already 
seen, capital deepening was a factor that accounted for much of Japan’s rapid economic 
growth. Usually, the marginal productivity of capital and the rate of return to capital 
will decline as capital deepening continues, so that, as is well known, countries cannot 
maintain rapid growth by capital deepening forever. In the Japanese case, however, 
thanks to her still high saving rates, capital deepening continued even in this era of 
deceleration. At the same time, it should be noted that she also suffered a serious 
decline in the rate of return to capital (figure 9) with private sector investment 
weakened (figure 11).23 In the case of the manufacturing sector, especially, capital 
                                                  
22 D. Jorgenson, M. Kuroda and M. Nishimizu, “Japan-U.S. industry-level productivity 
comparisons, 1969-1979”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, vol. 1, 
no. 1, pp. 1-30 (1987). 
23 It is worth reporting here that among OCED countries only Japan and Korea 
experienced very rapid capital deepening and a swift decline in the rate of return to 
 12formation became so small that the net real capital stock recorded a decline in the 
period of 2000-02.24
 
The negative effects of the above-listed factors on Japan’s economic growth can be 
shown by decomposing growth into its components in a growth accounting exercise. 
Table 3 indicates that all three factors contributed to the decline: labour service input 
growth (both in man-hours and in labour quality), capital service input growth, and TFP 
growth all slowed down or turned negative. Among the three factors, the decline in 
capital service input growth is the largest and appears to be the main cause of Japan’s 
deceleration. But it should be remembered that capital accumulation is endogenously 
determined and the slowdown in labour service input growth and TFP growth reduced 
the rate of return to capital and brought about a rapid decline in capital accumulation. 
Table 3 also shows that in the 1970s and 80s, the manufacturing sector enjoyed higher 
TFP growth than the non-manufacturing sector, but that in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
TFP growth in the manufacturing sector also stagnated. The swift decline in TFP 
growth in the manufacturing sector can be partly explained by the idling of capital stock, 
which was caused by the recession in this period. However, even taking account of the 
decline in the capacity utilization rate of capital, we obtain a similarly rapid declining 
trend in TFP growth in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Manufacturing industries usually enjoy higher TFP growth and are generally more 
capital intensive than the other sectors. De-industrialization, therefore, will lower a 
country’s rate of TFP growth and of capital deepening, thus decreasing the overall rate 
of economic growth. Like other developed countries, Japan experienced continuous 
de-industrialization and an expansion of the service sector. As figure 11 shows, the 
period after 1970 saw de-industrialization accelerated twice. The first acceleration 
occurred after the first oil shock and the second after the burst of the “bubble economy” 
in 1992. The second acceleration in de-industrialization seems to have been caused by a 
decline in the domestic demand for investment goods as well as Japan’s direct 
investment abroad. In the 1990s, Japanese firms relocated production to other Asian 
countries (primarily the ASEAN countries and China) in order to lower wage and other 
production costs. In the case of the electrical machinery industry, especially, there was a 
sharp increase in overseas production and a decline in domestic production and net 
                                                                                                                                                  
capital. See H. K. Pyo and K. H. Nam, “A test of the convergence hypothesis by rates of 
return to capital: evidence from OECD countries”, mimeo. (Seoul: Seoul National 
University, 1999). 
24 JIP Database (http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/database/d04.html). 
 13exports in the period 1990-2003. Since it is mainly large productive firms that invested 
abroad, this relocation of production may well have led to the closure of productive 
establishments in Japan. Many establishments could not survive in the period 
1990-2003. Only 44% of all the establishments which existed in 1990 survived until 
2003 and not many new establishments were opened during this period. As a result, the 
number of establishments declined by 33%. It is important to note that the survival rate 
is not high even in the case of establishments in the top labour-productivity group in 
each manufacturing sectors. From 1990 to 2003, only 47% of establishments survived by 
2003, of all those ranked in the top three deciles in each of the 50 manufacturing sectors 
at the time of 1990.25  
 
In addition to the supply-side factors, which we listed above, there was a demand-side 
factor that further decelerated Japan’s economic growth in the 1980s and 90s, namely, 
Japan’s excess saving problem. Although private (gross) investment declined in the 
1980s and 90s, the private (gross) saving rate remained at a high level (figure 11). This 
growing saving-investment balance created an excess supply of domestic product and 
kept Japan at a continuous risk of recession. There were three ways in which the excess 
saving was used. In the early 1980s, Japan used the excess saving for the accumulation 
of foreign assets. In figure 11, this is reflected as a huge current account surplus. But 
trade imbalance with the US caused serious trade frictions, which resulted in a 
realignment of yen-dollar rates after the Plaza Accord of 1985. Frightened by 
unprecedented yen appreciation and pushed by pressure from the US government, 
Japan’s monetary authority excessively relaxed its monetary policy, thus causing 
“bubble” phenomena in the late 80s economy. In the “bubble” years, Japan’s excess 
saving was used for fixed capital formation (figure 11), especially in the real estate 
sector. As a result of the burst of the bubble in 1992 brought on by excessively tight 
monetary policy, Japan was left with a huge unproductive capital stock and mountains 
of non-performing loans. In order to mitigate deflation, the Japanese government 
substantially expanded fiscal expenditure. The excess saving was thus used to finance 
government debt (figure 11). Although the major uses of the excess saving successively 
changed during the 1980s and ‘90s, Japan always faced the problem of a scarcity of final 
demand during this period and suffered economic stagnation except during the “bubble 
economy” of the late 80s. 
                                                  
25 K. Fukao, Y. G. Kim and H. U. Kwon, “Plant Turnover and TFP Dynamics in 
Japanese Manufacturing”, Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series, no.180, (Tokyo, 
Hitotsubashi University, 2006). 
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4. Outlook for the future 
 
Having had a quick look at the history of Japan’s economic development and recent 
trends, we are now in a position to speculate on the outlook for Japan’s future. Most of 
the factors which have led to the deceleration of economic growth are likely to continue 
for a long while. Japan’s working age population is expected to shrink at an average 
annual rate of 0.8% in the next twenty years. There are no signs that the slowdown in 
the rise in schooling years will be reversed in the near future. Although Japan 
experienced a rapid decline in private investment in the last decade, her capital-labour 
ratio is still at the global top and we can expect no further substantial capital deepening. 
As the baby boomers retire, the ageing and shrinking of the population will create social 
friction and pose an economic burden in near future. Many economists expect a 
continuous decline in the saving rate and a shrinking of the current account surplus. 
The shrinking of the current account surplus will accelerate Japan’s 
de-industrialization.  
 
There are a couple of positive exceptions in this long list of negative trends. One is that 
the ageing of Japan’s population will rid the economy of the excess saving problem. 
More important, perhaps, is the other sign which concerns the way in which production 
skills are utilised, the linchpin of the ‘high growth era’ regime. Despite the recent fuss 
about ‘new Anglo-American models’ of employment practices, the so-called Japanese 
system will continue to be used by major manufacturing firms such as Toyota and 
Canon. A telling example is that in recent years a growing number of manufacturing 
companies started employing a new production system called ‘cell production’. This 
involves a small team of skilled workers (usually two to five) performing multiple 
production tasks, placing more emphasis on workers’ skills rather than line structures 
and, thus, reversing the previous trend towards automation and conveyor systems.26 
Although it is premature to predict that this would become the new model for Japanese 
manufacturing in the twenty-first century, the evidence suggests that Japanese 
manufacturing firms are determined to respond to the prolonged stagnation after the 
‘bubble’ years and to improve manufacturing efficiency by adopting a new model which 
                                                  
26 K. Isa and T. Tsuru, “Cell production and workplace innovation in Japan: toward a 
new model for Japanese manufacturing?”, Industrial Relations, vol.41, no.4 (2002), 
pp.548-578. 
 15is indeed a variant of the traditional system centred on human skills.   
 
Whatever the trend in manufacturing, however, its share is shrinking. Thus, 
productivity growth in the non-manufacturing sector will be a key for a prosperous 
future. Are Japanese non-manufacturing industries productive? Do they have as good a 
record as manufacturing industries? How do their productivity levels fare if compared 
with other countries’?   
 
The Japan Industry Productivity (JIP) Database tells us that TFP growth in the 
non-manufacturing sector has been sluggish for the 1970-2002 period. Figure 12 shows 
that even in this period of de-industrialisation the rate of productivity growth was 
unmistakably higher in the manufacturing sector than in the non-manufacturing sector. 
This is a finding which casts doubt upon the conventional interpretation that structural 
change is a consequence of changing differentials in productivity and earnings. In the 
Japanese case, it is likely that the on-going growth of the service economy is not a result 
of any surge in productivity growth within the sector. Admittedly a close look at figure 
12 reveals that in the most recent period of 2000-2002 the gap between the sectors 
narrowed, but it is hazardous to make a prediction from this short-term change. 
Moreover, a recent work by Baily and Solow on industry-level TFP and labour 
productivity of major developed countries in the 1990s offers us a similarly depressing 
picture.27 According to table 4, the TFP and labour productivity levels of Japan’s 
manufacturing industries are very high (except in the case of food processing). In 
contrast, the labour productivity levels in non-manufacturing industries such as retail 
and construction, are well below the levels in the US and major EU countries. Of course, 
the tendency for non-manufacturing’s productivity growth lags behind manufacturing 
per se is no surprise, but what the Baily and Solow paper has revealed is that in Japan 
the productivity gap between the two sectors is unusually wide.   
 
This can be a legacy from the past. Although it is not easy to conduct international 
comparisons for the past century, it is possible to show how Japan’s sectoral 
differentials in labour productivity changed over the period before 1960. Kuznets’s 
classic work on Economic Growth of Nations contains tables showing changing shares of 
sectors in national product and workforce in various countries.28 Although few has 
                                                  
27 M.N. Baily and R.M. Solow, “International productivity comparison built from the 
firm level”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 15, no. 3 (2001), pp. 151-172. 
28 S. Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and Production Structure 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). Although those data were revised 
 16ventured so far, it is tempting to calculate from those data changing sectoral differences 
in average labour productivity for the countries concerned. For example, percentage 
figures for Japan are: in 1872, the share of primary employment was 85% who, 
according to statistics of 1880, produced 63% of total output, while secondary and 
tertiary workers, 6% and 9% of the total workforce, produced 16% and 21% of the 
national product respectively; in 1950, the distribution of employment between the 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors became 48%, 27% and 25% while the shares in 
national product were 26%, 39% and 35% respectively. All this seems to suggest that 
productivity differentials between the primary and the non-primary sector were 
substantial in the initial stage, and that the differentials narrowed over time.   
 
Figure 13 sets out changing productivity differentials relative to the primary sector, 
implied by the percentage figures in the Kuznets tables, as Path I. They do indicate that 
in the 1870s average labour productivity in manufacturing and services was more than 
three times as high as that of the primary sector, and that the general trends thereafter 
were on the decrease although the differential for manufacturing turned sharply up 
from 1950 to 1960. Intuitively, the result is against what we know as Petty’s Law. 
According to Petty’s observations made more than three hundred years ago, and also to 
Colin Clark’s painstaking work done in the early twentieth century, the centre of gravity 
in economic activity will shift from agriculture to manufacturing, and then to services, 
as labour productivity rises accordingly, but what Path I shows is exactly the opposite. 
This is because the employment data Kuznets relied on are compiled according to the 
worker’s principal occupation: no allowance was made with respect to his or her 
subsidiary occupation. Indeed, as Thomas Smith and other economic historians have 
argued,29 by-employment was widespread in Tokugawa and Meiji society where more 
than 80% of the working-age population were classified as ‘farmers’. But the term 
‘farmer’ was so omnibus that it is difficult to know to what extent such by-employments 
were hidden from ordinary occupation tables. Fortunately, there is a pilot census for one 
province called Kai (present-day Yamanashi prefecture) taken in 1879, in which not just 
principal but subsidiary occupations were enumerated. Table 5 summarises 
occupational interrelationships between the sectors in a matrix form. On the face of it, 
                                                                                                                                                  
by Ohkawa and his associates, it is still worth using the Kuznets tables since the LTES 
volumes do not include series before 1885. 
29 T.C. Smith, Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization, 1750-1920 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), ch.3, and O. Saito, “Pre-modern economic growth: 
Japan and the West”, GEHN Working Paper series, no.16 (Department of Economic 
History, LSE, 2005). A revised version of the latter is available upon request. 
 17the sectoral inter-exchange of labour in the form of by-employment was not particularly 
extensive; in reality, however, since the size of the agricultural sector was overwhelming, 
11% of the 194,000 ‘farmers’ who were by-employed in industry represented a 
substantially large proportion of the workforce of the manufacturing sector. Based on 
this Kai evidence, and on the assumption that any by-employed person devoted 50% of 
his or her labour to one sector and the rest to another, re-calculation is made for the 
1870s. Then an additional assumption is made that by 1925 any workers in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors ceased to have subsidiary occupation, while still 10% of 
the primary workers had non-primary by-employment (with two-thirds to the secondary 
and one-third to the tertiary sector); and no adjustment is made for the post-war 
benchmark years of 1950 and 1960.   
 
The results are shown in figure 13 as Path II. Crude as this exercise may be, the 
revealed pattern of productivity differentials appears more reasonable. First, the initial 
levels of productivity in manufacturing and services relative to agriculture’s were far 
lower than previously thought. Second, the differentials increased as industrialisation 
proceeded. Third, there was virtually no rise in the differentials during the period 
between 1925 and 1950, but it should be explained by disturbing effects of was in the 
period of 1940-45. More interesting in this context, however, is the relationships 
between the manufacturing and service sectors. The manufacturing-services 
differential increased gradually as industrialisation took off in the early twentieth 
century, which is a finding consistent with Colin Clark’s observation based on 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century data.30 Then, the productivity differentials 
between the two sectors unmistakably widened with the phenomenal growth of the 
manufacturing sector since 1950. In other words, it is likely that the unusually wide 
productivity gap Baily and Solow found for Japan in the 1990s can be traced back to the 
beginning of the high growth period. In manufacturing, as we have seen, unprecedented 
capital deepening was accompanied by the establishment of a very Japanese mode of 
skill formation at the shop floor level. In contrast, commerce and services seem to have 
remained relatively labour intensive. Of course, the sector is diverse and the ways in 
which value added is created are very different from those in manufacturing. Some of 
the trades in the sector are skill intensive as well as labour intensive, but even in those 
                                                  
30 C. Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1951), 
ch.vii. One exception the author noted is Britain between 1837 and the 1860s. During 
that period, the rise in productivity of tertiary industry was swifter than that of 
manufacturing industry, which he thought, must have been ‘due no doubt to the 
introduction of railway and steamship transport’ (p.315). 
 18skill-oriented areas it seems that there emerged no organisational innovation 
comparable to the Toyota production system in manufacturing. Unless a new, promising 
regime of productivity growth would emerge in the expanding service sector, therefore, 
Japan’s outlook for the early twenty-first century would not be very bright. 
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Table 1. Capital formation ratios in the private and state sectors 
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Source: R. Minami, The Economic Development of Japan: A Quantitative Study 
(London: Macmillan, 1986), pp.174-75. Percentages of real GNE. 
 
 
Table 2. Government expenditure as a percentage of GNE/GDP: Japan and UK 
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Source: Minami, op.cit. pp.333, 337. Japanese figures are percentages of GNE while 
British figures are those of GDP. 
 
 21Figure 2. Current account surplus-GDP ratio of the developed country group (countries 




Per capita GDP: A. Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: 
OECD Development Centre, 2001) 
Current account surplus-GDP ratio: B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: 
Europe,  1750-1988, (New York: Stockton Press, 1992), International Historical 
Statistics: The Americas, 1750-1988, Second Edition (New York: Stockton Press, 1993), 
International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania, 1750-1988, Second Revised 
Edition (New York: Stockton Press, 1995). 
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Figure 3. Current account surplus-GDP Ratio of the developed country group (countries 





Per capita GDP: A. Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: 
OECD Development Centre, 2001) 


















































































































Sources: Data for 1885-1929: K. Ohkawa et al., Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan, 
Vol. 1: National Income (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha), p. 178. 
Data for 1930-1954: Ohkawa et al., op.cit. p. 179. 
Data for 1955-2000 on 1968 SNA basis: Department of National Accounts, Economic 
and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Annual Report on 
National Accounts 2006 (Tokyo). 
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Source: World Bank, “World Bank, World Saving Database”. 
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Source: Matthew T. Jones and Maurice Obstfeld, "Saving, Investment, and Gold: A 
Reassessment of Historical Current Account Data," in Money, Capital Mobility, and 
Trade: Essays in Honor of Robert Mundell, edited by Guillermo A. Calvo, Rudi 
Dornbusch, and Maurice Obstfeld (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 
 
 















Source: Y. Godo and Y. Hayami, “Catching up in education in the economic catch-up of 
Japan with the United States, 1890-1990”, Economic Development and Cultural 






























































































Note: The working age population is defined as those aged between 15 and 64. 




Figure 9. Capital deepening and the diminishing rate of


















































































































Real capital-outpt ratio 




Source: JIP Database (http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/database/d04.html) 
 




























































































































































































Japan: gross value added of the
manufacturing sector/GDP
Japan: number of workers in
manufacturing sector/total number
of workers
US: gross value added of the
manufacturing sector/GDP
US: number of workers in the
manufacturing sector/total number
 
Sources: Department of National Accounts, Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Annual Report on National Accounts 2006 
(Tokyo). 
The Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President 2005. 
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Figure 11. Japan’s saving-investment balance of the private sector and the general 
Government:  1970-2000          (percent  of  nominal  GDP) 
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Source: Research and Statistics Devision, Bank of Japan, Major Economic and Financial Data CD-ROM 2000,






Table 3. GDP growth and its decomposition for the Japanese economy 
1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-2000 2000-2002
5.47% 5.69% 3.92% 4.91% 1.45% 1.27% -0.22%
0.24% 1.35% 0.81% 0.68% -0.01% -0.06% -0.98%
Contribution of Man-hour
Growth
-0.42% 0.87% 0.31% 0.38% -0.41% -0.42% -1.03%
Contribution of Labor Quality
Growth
0.66% 0.48% 0.51% 0.30% 0.40% 0.36% 0.04%
3.59% 1.98% 2.12% 2.46% 1.41% 0.92% 0.37%
Contribution of Capital
Quantity Growth
2.94% 2.06% 1.72% 1.87% 1.35% 0.79% 0.31%
Contribution of Capital
Quality Growth
0.65% -0.08% 0.40% 0.59% 0.05% 0.13% 0.06%
1.64% 2.37% 0.98% 1.77% 0.04% 0.41% 0.39%
1.25% 1.13% 1.25% 1.01% 0.27% 0.68% -0.03%
0.09% 0.74% -0.11% 0.80% -0.17% -0.02% 0.30%
TFP Growth of the Manufacturing
Sector
TFP Growth of the Non-
manufacturing Sector
Real GDP Growth
Contribution of Labor Service
Input Growth
Contribution of Capital Service
Input Growth
TFP Growth of the Whole
Economy
 
Note: Value-added growth rates are calculated by Laspeyres-type chain-linked index; 
the figures above therefore do not match those of the government SNA statistics. TFP 
growth rates of the manufacturing sector and that in the non-manufacturing sector are 
gross output base. TFP growth rates of the whole economy is value added base. Because 
of this difference, TFP growth rates of the whole economy are usually higher than 
weighted average of the TFP growth rates of the two sectors. 
Source: K. Fukao, S. Hamagata, T. Inui, K. Ito, H. U. Kwon, T. Makino, T. Miyagawa, Y. 
Nakanishi, and J. Tokui, “Estimation Procedures and TFP Analysis of the JIP Database 
2006 Provisional Version,” paper presented at the 3rd Meeting of the EU KLEMS 
Consortium, May 17-9, 2006, Valencia. 
 
 
 32Figure 12. Total factor productivity growth in the manufacturing and 

































































































a(51) n.a. n.a. n.a. 45
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iAirline productivity for France, Germany,
Netherlands and U.K. are all based on a European average.
Source: M.N. Baily and R.M. Solow, “International productivity comparison built from 
the firm level,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 15, no. 3 (2001), pp. 151-172. 
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Source: See text. 
 
 35Table 5. Principal and subsidiary occupations by sector (both sexes combined):   
Kai province, 1879 
 
  Subsidiary occupation (%)  Principal 





















 26  (100) 
 14  (100) 
 
Source: Tōkei-in, Kai no kuni genzai ninbetsu shirabe [Census of Kai province] (Tokyo: 
Tōkei-in, 1882). 
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